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Introduction
In the study of a tax system, tax avoidance and tax evasion should be considered. The first mathematical analysis by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) modeled tax evasion as a gamble: for a given audit probability and a penalty proportional to the undeclared income, what share of their income do risk averse individuals report? Of course, the lower the tax rate, the higher the share of reported income. Subsequent studies have discovered that the actual probability of audits and the penalty rates are insufficient to explain why citizens of healthier societies pay income taxes in the propensity they do. Therefore, another explanatory variable should be introduced, tax morale, as in Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) . For example, we may assume that every individual has two parameters: his income and his tax morale. The tax system can also be characterized by two parameters: the marginal tax rate and the cash-back. Apart from stabilization, the tax system has two functions: income redistribution and financing of public goods. Simonovits (2010) studied the impact of exogenous tax morality on income redistribution and public services, while Frey and Torgler (2007) neglected income differences and redistribution and confined attention to financing public goods. A growing literature extends the analysis to agent-based models, see e.g. Lima and Zaklan (2008) . Recently Méder, Simonovits and Vincze (2011) the second one of the three models, namely where individuals maximize utilities and observe only their neighbors' behavior. We prove a conjecture of that paper: under mild conditions, the steady state is unique, symmetric (everybody reports the same income) and globally asymptotically stable.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines a simple model of tax evasion. Section 3 proves the existence and global asymptotic stability of the nontrivial symmetric steady state. Section 4 shows that by dropping concavity, the steady state can be asymmetric and stable periodic orbits can also emerge. Section 5 draws the conclusions.
A simple model of tax evasion
There are I individuals in the country, indexed as i = 1, . . . , I. Individual i observes the behavior of his neighbors, whose nonempty set is denoted by N i ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , I} and the number of its elements is n i . Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . . We assume that every individual has the same income, for simplicity, unity. Then there is no reason for income redistribution, the tax only finances the provision of public goods.
Let x i,t be individual i's income report in period t, 0 ≤ x i,t ≤ 1. (By the logic of the theory, the government also knows that everybody's income is unity, nevertheless, it tolerates underreporting.)
In period t the average nationwide reported income is equal tox
At the same time, individual i observes his local averagē
Let θ ∈ (0, 1) be the tax rate. Let c i,t denote the individual i's consumption: c i,t = 1 − θx i,t , its traditional utility is then u(c i,t ). Let the moral utility be z(x i,t ,x i,t−1 ), the utility derived from his own report x i,t and influenced by this neighbors' previous average reportx i,t−1 . Finally let the per capita public expenditure be θx t , whose individual utility is q(θx t ).
The individual i's utility at time t+1 is the sum of three terms:
Of course, maximizing U * i,t , the individual neglects the third term, because this depends on the simultaneous decisions of many other individuals. In other words, in period t+1 individual i reports such an income which maximizes his narrow utility:
It is reasonable to assume that the maximum is attained at a unique x i,t+1 =: F(x i,t ) ∈ [0, 1]. This complies with property
a direct consequence of the usual strict concavity assumption on the utility functions u and z (·,x) . Here, of course,
etc.) stand for the respective partial derivatives. Now we are in a position to define the transition rule by letting
where starting from the initial state x 0 = (x 1,0 , . . . , x I,0 ), x t = (x 1,t , . . . , x I,t ) is the vector of reported incomes at time t, and
We are interested in the asymptotic behavior when iterating the transition rule F as a self-map of the I-dimensional unit cube [0, 1] I . Note that steady states of tax evasion are just fixed points of F.
Our main question is as follows: are the reported incomes eventually the same, regardless of initial state and individuals? In other words:
1. do we have an asymptotically stable steady state with the same reported incomes? 2. are all nontrivial initial states attracted to it?
The next section is devoted to determine a natural class of transition rules for which both answers are affirmative.
Examples and an abstract mathematical result
We keep the notation introduced in the previous section for time, individuals, state and transition rule. Dependence of function F on parameters will sometimes be suppressed.
Example 1. Simonovits (2010) and Méder, Simonovits and Vincze (2011) consider the utility function
, where the new parameter m > 0 represents the exogeneous tax morale. Equation
Function E is quadratic in x and satisfies E(0,x) = mx ≥ 0, E(1,x) = −θ < 0. Thus equation (1) has a unique solution
Actually, forx = 0, (1) simplifies to x = 0. Forx > 0 the discriminant of (1) is positive, and the classical formula for the smaller solution of a quadratic polynomial applies. Smoothness of function F atx = 0 is a consequence of the implicit function theorem because E(0, 0) = 0, and E ′ 1 (0, 0) = −θ 0. In order to find additional fixed points of F (ifx > 0) one has to solve equation
Here again, function E(
It is crucial that F ′ 1 = 1 whenever m = θ. For θ ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily given, Theorem 9.3 in Glendinning (1994) yields that the one-parameter family of discrete-time dynamical systems {x → F(x, m, θ)} m>0 undergoes a transcritical bifurcation at m = θ.
Returning to Example 1, we obtain by implicit differentiation that F 
It follows that there exists γ > 0 such that, given an initial state
Constant γ depends on F and the finer connectivity properties of the network. Now a simple monotonicity argument results in the inductive chain of inequalities
valid for each t ∈ N. By letting t → ∞, we are done. Our next example shows that the connectivity part of the standing assumption cannot be weakened to connectivity.
Example 2. Keeping the analytic part of the standing assumption, we consider the case of I ≥ 3 individuals located on a circle and assume that everybody knows only his next-door neighbors' reported income from the previous year. (To calculate the income report based only on these data means that the person is other-directed using the terminology of Riesman (1950) .) With convention I + 1 = 1 and 0 = I, this means that N i = {i − 1, i + 1}, n i = 2. Thenx i,t = (x i−1,t + x i+1,t )/2. It is immediate that the connectivity part of the standing assumption is satisfied if and only if I is odd (and then integer T can be chosen for I − 1 and min 1≤i≤I x i,I−1 > 0 for each x 0 ∈ [0, 1] I \ {0}). Remark 3. The analytic part of the standing assumption is implied by assuming that function
. These stronger assumptions lead to a simple convergence estimate. In fact, by continuity, there exists an x * ∈ (0, x o ) with the property that
I is a contraction with constant q in the topology of the ℓ ∞ norm. In fact, the collection of inequalities x * ≤ x j ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , I implies that
On the other hand, the ℓ ∞ matrix norm (i.e. the maximum absolute row sum) of the Jacobian J(x) for each x ∈ [x * , 1] N is not greater than q because
It follows that x o is an exponentially stable fixed point of F. Note also that the monotonicity-concavity assumption is a consequence of a finite collection of inequalities in terms of the first, second, and third order (mixed partial) derivatives of the utility functions u and z. In particular, the most convenient general assumption of guaranteeing existence and uniqueness for x = F(x) (i.e., for the solution of equation Returning to Example 1 again (and assuming the connectivity part of the standing assumption), we note that m ≤ θ implies global asymptotic stability for the trivial (and then unique) fixed point 0 of the iteration dynamics induced by F. In particular, for θ ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily given, the I-dimensional discrete-time dynamical system F : . This is an essential weakening of the analytic part of the standing assumption (which corresponds to dropping concavity of the utility function in our tax evasion model) which makes the existence of asymptotically stable asymmetric steady states and also the existence of asymptotically stable nontrivial periodic orbits possible, see Examples 2A, 2B below.
By letting x ≤ y if and only if x i ≤ y i for each i, a closed partial order on [0, 1] I is introduced. We write x ≺ y if x i < y i for each i. Clearly F(x) ≤ F(y) whenever x ≤ y. In the terminology of Hirsch and Smith (2005) , F is a discrete-time monotone dynamical system or monotone map. Monotonicity is strong if F(x) ≺ F(y) whenever x ≤ y and x y. If only F t (x) ≺ F t (y) for some t, then F is eventually strongly monotone. Nonzero elements of the Jacobian are positive and arranged in the same pattern determined solely by the topology of the network. For each x ∈ [0, 1], (J(x)) i, j is nonzero if and only if j ∈ N i , i, j = 1, . . . , I.
The connectivity part of the standing assumption implies that, from a certain exponent onward, powers of the Jacobian are positive matrices. Hence F is eventually strongly monotone and Theorem 5.26 in Hirsch and Smith (2005) applies. The conclusion is that, for an open and dense set of the starting points x ∈ [0, 1] I , F(x) is converging to some periodic orbit.
Remark 4. In case the connectivity part of the standing assumption is violated, F cannot be eventually strongly monotone: with Q denoting the union of facets of the unit cube [0, 1] I anchored at vertex 0, there exists a j * ∈ {1, . . . , I} with the property that F t (e j * ) ∈ Q for each t ∈ R. This is a consequence of the crucial observation we made in proving Theorem 1. In fact, if A t j e j is a positive vector for each j, then A T is a positive matrix with T = ∏ 1≤ j≤I t j . In particular, consider case I = 4 of Example 2. Then, for each x ∈ (0, 1], the F-trajectory starting from 
Property (2) 3 ) is a two-periodic point of F. Asymptotic stability can be ensured by choosing
) sufficiently small, see Fig. 1 . A great variety of similar examples (arbitrary periods, various moving averages, various networks) will be presented in Garay and Várdai (2011) .
Note that x = ( 3 ) is a steady state of F 2 , and a twoperiodic point of F 3 . Note also that F 2 and F 3 are strongly monotone.
Remaining at case I = 3 of Example 2 it is worth mentioning that monotonicity of F alone implies that each steady state of F has the same coordinates. (In fact, x 1 ≤ x 2 is equivalent to x 1 = F( 
Conclusions
A tax evasion model leading to discrete time network dynamics with local interactions is presented. Under quite natural assumptions (somewhat weaker than the usual concavity assumption on the utility functions), uniqueness, symmetry and global asymptotic stability of the nontrivial steady state is proved.
